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Abstract
Edward Snowden’s disclosure of National Security Agency (“NSA”) bulk
collection of communications metadata was a highly disturbing shock to the
American public. The intelligence community was surprised by the response, as it
had largely not anticipated a strong negative public reaction to this surveillance
program. Controversy over the bulk metadata collection led to the 2015 passage of
the USA FREEDOM Act. The law mandated that the intelligence community
would collect the Call Detail Records (“CDR”) from telephone service providers in
strictly limited ways, not in bulk, and only under order from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court. The new program initially seemed to be working
well, although the fact that from 40 court orders in both 2016 and 2017, the NSA
collected hundreds of millions of CDRs created public concern. Then in June 2018
the NSA announced it had purged three years’ worth of CDRs due to “technical
irregularities”; later the agency made clear that it would not seek the program’s
renewal.
This Article demystifies these situations, analyzing how forty orders might
lead to the collection of several million CDRs and providing the first explanation
that fits the facts of what might have caused the “technical irregularities” leading
to the purge of records. This Article also exposes a rather remarkable lacuna in
Congressional oversight: even at the time of the passage of the USA FREEDOM
Act a changing terrorist threat environment and changing communications
technologies had effectively eliminated value of the CDR collection. We conclude
with recommendations on conducting intelligence oversight.
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Introduction
The first of Edward Snowden’s disclosures was a Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISC”) order requiring that Verizon provide the National
Security Agency (“NSA”) with daily Call Detail Records (“CDRs”) for all
communications to, from, or within the United States.1 The order, based on a FISC
interpretation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, required Verizon
to release all call routing information, including session identifying information
(e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (“IMSI”) number, International Mobile station Equipment
Identity (“IMEI) number”), trunk identifiers, telephone calling card numbers, and
time and duration of calls.2 The Snowden disclosures and the public controversy
that followed led Congress in 2015 to end bulk collection and amend the CDR
authorities with the adoption of the USA FREEDOM Act.3
The bulk collection program was introduced in 2001 after a failure to
recognize that an intercepted call occurred between an Al-Qaeda safe house in
Sana, Yemen and a U.S. number.4 But since then the terrorist threat had changed
from a highly centralized, almost corporate structure to a more diffuse recruitment
effort exemplified by ISIS. Communication technologies also changed. Both in the
United States and around the world, there was a shift from wireline phones to
mobiles to smartphones, and phone calls to Internet Protocol (“IP”)-based
applications. When terrorists use mobile phones for communication, it is for IPbased communications, not for phone calls or short message service (“SMS”) texts.
These changes transformed the value of investigative tools provided under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”). Collection of IP-based
communications is conducted not under Section 215, but under FISA Section 702,
which enables the Intelligence Community (“IC”) to target communications of nonU.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.5 Section
702 has become pivotal in tracking and preventing terrorist plots against the United
States while the value of Section 215 collection has waned.

1

Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-recordsverizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/F7BT-SQSZ].
2
Order at 2, In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Business Network Services Inc. on Behalf of MCI
Communication Services, Inc. D/B/A Verizon Business Services, No. BR 13-80 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25,
2013).
3
Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnetcollection and Online Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268
(2015).
4
See DOES STATE SPYING MAKE US SAFER?: THE MUNK DEBATE ON MASS SURVEILLANCE 25
(Rudyard Griffiths ed., 2014).
5
Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet
Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 120–21 (2015).
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While controversy surrounded the USA FREEDOM Act’s passage in 2015,
all appeared fine afterwards. Then in June 2018, NSA announced that it had found
“technical irregularities” in the CDRs being provided by the telecommunications
providers under USA FREEDOM Act6 and deleted three years’ worth of records
collected under the program.7 More was to come. In March 2019, the Washington
Post disclosed that the NSA had halted collection since at least September 2018;8
the Wall Street Journal reported that the NSA recommended not seeking the
program’s renewal.9
This Article explains why. This Article also explains the high number of
CDRs collected under USA FREEDOM Act in 2016, 2017, and 2018, and possible
reasons for the purge. This Article also shows how changes in technology and
communication methods and the foreign-terrorist threat have sharply lessened the
value of the CDR program and made its use largely unnecessary.
Section I begins this Article with a brief history of NSA’s telephony
metadata and Section 702 programs and the foreign-terrorist threat. Section II
examines the few orders for collection of CDRs, but seemingly disproportionately
large number of CDRs collected, and the June 2018 purge of three years of collected
CDRs. The analysis in this Article, based on the technical aspects of collection,
goes a good way towards explaining the reasons behind these. This should move
the discussion from concerns regarding overcollection to questions over the
program’s efficacy—which is where the focus properly belongs. Section III
demonstrates how terrorists’ utilization of IP-based communications has made the
metadata program far less beneficial. Section IV probes Congress’s failure to
carefully examine the efficacy of the CDR program prior to USA FREEDOM Act’s
adoption in 2015 and examines what Congress should do. Section V provides a
brief conclusion.
The value of investigative tools changes with time and circumstances.
While almost all investigative tools can, on occasion, uncover some unknown
information, it makes little sense to deploy surveillance tools when they cease to be
efficacious. Focusing on Section 215 collection, this Article shows how the
program lost usefulness, illuminating the need to carry out efficacy analyses on a
6

NSA Reports Data Deletion, IC ON THE RECORD (June 28, 2018),
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/175347073998/nsa-reports-data-deletion-june-28-2018
[https://perma.cc/X3DT-F68T].
7
Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Purges Hundreds of Millions of Call and Text Records, N.Y. TIMES (June
29,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/29/us/politics/nsa-call-records-purged.html
[https://perma.cc/X9KZ-RHQN].
8
See Ellen Nakashima, NSA Has Halted a Counterterrorism Program Relying on Phone Records
Amid
Doubts
About
its
Utility,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
5,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-has-halted-a-counterterrorismprogram-relying-on-phone-records-amid-doubts-about-its-utility/2019/03/05/f2d2793e-3f80-11e9922c-64d6b7840b82_story.html [https://perma.cc/LZP2-L8ZJ].
9
See Dustin Volz & Warren P. Strobel, NSA Recommends Dropping Phone Surveillance Program,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nsa-recommends-dropping-phonesurveillance-program-11556138247 [https://perma.cc/538R-SRSK].
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continuing basis. Collection costs time and resources; increasing the size of the
haystack may make it more difficult to find the needle.10 Collecting all possible
data does not necessarily make us safer.
I. The History of NSA’s Bulk Collection Programs
A. The History of the Telephony Metadata Program
In the lead up to the September 11 attacks, there was a failure to follow up
on crucial pieces of evidence that, properly studied, might have prevented those
attacks. This included calls made by Mawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar (two
of Bin-Laden’s muscle men personally picked to carry out the 9/11 attack on the
Pentagon) to a Yemeni number connected to a safe house for bin Laden’s
operations.11 The calls were made from an apartment in San Diego, California.12
NSA was listening in to the Yemeni end of the call, which was over a satellite
phone.13 Eavesdroppers to satellite calls typically overhear only one end of the
communication. Without access to the switch or CDR, NSA did not learn the
location of the other end of the call until it was too late.14
That was not the only failure. Analysts understood that spectacular attacks
were being planned, but as the 9/11 Commission later put it: “When reports did not
specify where the attacks were to take place, officials presumed that they would
again be overseas.”15 Searching for the communication’s other end was thus not a
high priority for U.S. signals intelligence. Even if it had been, it is not clear that
NSA would have been able to determine the call’s origin. As former NSA Director
Michael Hayden later noted, “[i]f we had the 215 program at the time, we would
have thrown that selector at that mass of American phone bills and phone
connection and said, ‘Did anybody here talk to this number in Yemen?’ and kajink! The San Diego number would have popped up.”16
On October 4, 2001, President George W. Bush directed the Secretary of
Defense to undertake a program of collection of telephone and Internet

See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BULK COLLECTION OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE: TECHNICAL
OPTIONS 54 (2015) [hereinafter National Research Council’s Bulk SIGINT Collection Report].
11
MATTHEW AID, THE SECRET SENTRY: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY 209–11 (2009).
12
DOES STATE SPYING MAKE US SAFER: THE MUNK DEBATE ON MASS SURVEILLANCE 25 (Rudyard
Griffiths ed., 2014).
13
The safe house and phone are described in JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE
ULTRA-SECRET NSA FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING OF AMERICA 7–8 (2008).
14
DOES STATE SPYING MAKE US SAFER, supra note 12, at 25–26.
15
THE 9/11 COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE UNITED STATES 257, 263 (2004).
16
See Statement for the Record of Robert S. Mueller III, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Before
the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (Feb. 24, 2004),
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/021103mueller.html [https://perma.cc/3G5L-9CR2]; DOES
STATE SPYING MAKE US SAFER, supra note 12, at 25–26.
10
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communications, known as STELLAR WIND.17 The presidential authorization was
renewed for over six years, allowing warrantless surveillance of the metadata of
American citizens’ telephone and email communications, financial transactions,
and Internet activity and, under certain restrictions, the content of those
communications and transactions.18
In December 2005, the New York Times broke a story about the warrantless
wiretapping program.19 One telecommunications operator then expressed concern
to the government about providing telephony metadata “under Presidential
Authority” rather than under court order.20 The administration moved to change this
and in May 2006—as it happened, thirteen days after USA Today exposed the
existence of the bulk metadata collection program—the FISC signed the first order
placing STELLAR WIND’s telephony metadata collection under FISA’s
authorities.21
The court relied on an interpretation of the USA PATRIOT Act, which
amended FISA Section 501. The original section permitted access under court order
to “business records” held by common carriers in the context of foreign intelligence
or international terrorism investigations. The amended act allowed the court to
compel the production of “any tangible things including books, records, papers,
documents, and other items”22 when necessary for an authorized investigation
“against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”23 To allow
for STELLAR WIND’s mass collection of communications metadata to be brought
DEP’T OF DEF., ET AL., No. 2009-0013-A, REPORT ON
1 (2009), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/PSP-0918-15-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNQ4-BZL8] [hereinafter DOJ Inspector General’s 2009 Report].
18
See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT 16 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CUK-5J3W]
[hereinafter PCLOB Section 702 Report].
19
James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Calls Without Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
16, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-withoutcourts.html [https://perma.cc/U54W-R4RW].
20
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, ST-09-0002, REPORT ON THE
PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, WORKING DRAFT 39–40 (Mar. 24, 2009),
https://www.emptywheel.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/090324-Draft-NSA-IG-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6CCQ-GB8B] (noting comments by NSA General Counsel Vito Potenza that the
decision to transition the telephony metadata program to the Business Records provision was due to
a private sector company reacting to the New York Times story) [hereinafter 2009 NSA Inspector
General’s PSP Working Draft Report]. This section did not appear in the published version of the
report. See DOJ Inspector General’s 2009 Report, supra note 17, at 54–55.
21
Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11,
2006, at A1.
22
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272,
287 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1)).
23
Congress amended the authority in 2006 further requiring that there be “reasonable grounds to
believe that the tangible objects sought are relevant.” USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 106, 120 Stat. 196 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)).
17

See OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE
THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
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under Section 215, the FISC adopted an expansive interpretation of “relevant”
encompassing non-targeted forms of collection.24
Beginning on May 24, 2006, the FISC issued quarterly orders to some U.S.
telephone companies directing them to provide NSA with all CDRs “on an ongoing
daily basis to the extent practicable.”25
Only after the Snowden disclosures did the government publicly
acknowledge the program. NSA Director Keith Alexander testified to the House
Intelligence Committee that information gathered from the Section 215 program
provided the U.S. government with “critical leads to help prevent over 50 potential
terrorist events in more than 20 countries around the world.”26 He later cited 54
cases in which the NSA bulk collection programs “contributed to our
understanding, and in many cases helped enable the disruption of terrorist plots.”27
But in December 2013, Director Alexander spoke of only eight events in which
Section 215 played a role in disrupting terrorist activity.28 In 2014, the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board concluded that the bulk metadata program was
useful domestically only once in identifying a previously unknown terrorist suspect
(Basaaly Moalin, who materially supported Al-Shabaab, an extremist Somali
militia with al-Qaeda ties).29
24

See Robert Chesney, Telephony
Metadata:
Is
the
Contact-Chaining
Program
Unsalvageable?, LAWFARE (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/telephony-metadatacontact-chaining-program-unsalvageable [https://perma.cc/L7AX-YVAF].
25
Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Certain Tangible Things for Investigations to
Protect Against International Terrorism, In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an
Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 06-05 (FISA Ct. May 23, 2006).
26
How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect Americans, and Why Disclosure Aids our Adversaries:
Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. On Intelligence, 113th Cong. (2013),
https://www.intel.gov/index.php/ic-on-the-record-database/results/43-hearing-of-the-housepermanent-select-committee-on-intelligence-on-how-disclosed-nsa-programs-protect-americans,and-why-disclosure-aids-our-adversaries [https://perma.cc/MSD2-NC86].
27
Gen. Keith Alexander, Remarks at the AFCEA International Cyber Symposium (June 28, 2013),
https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/speeches-testimonies/Article/1620137/remarks-by-gen-keithalexander-commander-us-cyber-command-uscybercom-director-n/
[https://perma.cc/TVB4LDEG].
28
Continued Oversight of U.S. Government Surveillance Authorities: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. 25 (2013).
29
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS
OF
THE
FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE
COURT
152–53
(2014),
https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TGY3-F9AV] [hereinafter PCLOB Section 215 Report]. In August 2016, David
Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, reported to the U.K. Parliament on
bulk surveillance powers, making the case for the utility of metadata collection programs. Anderson
clarified that his finding should not cast doubt on PCLOB’s conclusions. There are differences
between the Section 215 program and the U.K. authorities, which covers all metadata, not just calls
and texts; there are also different terrorism threats facing the United Kingdom and the United States,
resulting in a different scale of use. See DAVID ANDERSON, Q.C., REPORT OF THE BULK POWERS
REVIEW, 2016, Cm. 9326, ¶ 3.50-3.54 (UK),
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While the program failed to identify new terrorist suspects or disrupt
ongoing terrorist plots, it assisted in triaging in time-sensitive cases, corroborated
existing evidence, and allowed for “negative reporting,” enabling investigators to
focus resources where needed.30 CDRs were useful in establishing links between
suspects and also enabled going “backwards in time,” allowing intelligence
analysts to study past history of a newly discovered suspect.31
Implementing the Section 215 metadata collection program was
problematic, however, and problems with the technology resulted in compliance
issues in 2006–09.32 NSA operators had inadvertently violated the FISC’s orders, a
situation that Director of National Intelligence James Clapper would later describe
as a case in which NSA and the FISC simply lacked a shared understanding of how
the complex program worked.33 Repeated compliance issues and
misrepresentations resulted in the FISC suspending the program for roughly six
months in 2009.34
After the Snowden disclosures, President Obama appointed a five-person
review committee that studied various aspects of the exposed NSA surveillance
programs, concluding that the CDR program should be abandoned.35 The Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board similarly observed that the program raised
serious threats to privacy and civil liberties while showing “only limited value” and
should thus come to an end.36 A 2015 National Academies study determined that
there were no technical alternatives that would produce the same information.37
Meanwhile, ACLU, other civil liberties organizations, and individuals filed
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
546923/56730_Cm_9326_PRINT.PDF [https://perma.cc/34ZF-ZTMH].
30
Information collected in this way may also “rule out” a suspect by showing that the number is
actually that of a non-suspect (e.g. car mechanic or IT help desk) and thus not worth further
investigative time. See National Research Council’s Bulk SIGINT Collection Report, supra note
10, at 42–43.
31
National Research Council’s Bulk SIGINT Collection Report, supra note 10, at 51.
32
For a complete summary of all compliance issues, see Marcy Wheeler, “Institutional Lack of
Candor”: A Primer on Recent Unauthorized Activity by the Intelligence Community, DEMAND
PROGRESS (2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/demandprogress/reports/Institutional_Lack_of_Candor.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PX6T-5VJ9].
33
Press Release, Off. of Dir. Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Clapper Declassified Intelligence Community
Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) (Sep. 10, 2013), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases2013/item/927-dni-clapper-declassifies-intelligence-community-documents-regarding-collectionunder-section-501-of-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act-fisa [https://perma.cc/57HJ-LP8D].
34
The NSA querying of the bulk CDR collection was halted on March 2, 2009 after the FISC
became aware of problems with compliance. See In re Production of Tangible Things From
[redacted], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009) (reinstated on September 3, 2009); see also In
re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of
Tangible Things From [redacted], No. BR 09-13 (FISA Ct. Sept. 3, 2009).
35
See THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES,
THE NSA REPORT: LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD, at xxvi (2014).
36
See PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 29, at 16.
37
National Research Council’s Bulk SIGINT Collection Report, supra note 10.
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lawsuits challenging the program’s legality.38 They largely focused on the
program’s infringement of privacy rights and civil liberties.
In June 2015, Congress passed the USA FREEDOM Act, ending the bulk
collection program 180 days after the law’s enactment. The vote came less than a
month after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down the
government’s expansive interpretation of Section 215 justifying the metadata
collection.39 The USA FREEDOM Act clarified that the Section 215 program did
not authorize bulk collection; the IC would instead rely on providers’ own call
records in their normal course of business.40 Under the USA FREEDOM Act, the
government is required to seek a FISC order requiring the production of certain
CDRs the companies held. The companies would have to build infrastructure to
respond, with the technology “likely cost[ing] millions of dollars in the form of
reimbursements.”41 The system had to handle iterative querying across multiple
providers and was also required to provide CDR information whenever there was a
query—even if the data was no longer held in CDR format; building a system to do
these tasks correctly is quite complex.
B. The History of the Section 702 Program
While this Article’s focus is on the telephony metadata program, it is also
important to consider Section 702 because its authorities allow for targeting, for
foreign intelligence purposes, communications of foreign persons reasonably
believed to be located abroad, consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Section
702’s origins are in the Terrorist Surveillance Program, launched in the aftermath
of 9/11. The Terrorist Surveillance Program operated separately from the program
collecting communications metadata about telephone and email in bulk.42 The
President routinely renewed the program for “extraordinary emergency” reasons.
Chairs and leading members of Congressional committees and the presiding judge
of the FISC were briefed on the program’s existence.43
This warrantless wiretapping, which allows for collection of content and
metadata, was ultimately codified in Section 702 as part of the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008 and has been reauthorized twice.44 Section 702 requires the government

38

See, e.g., Complaint, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 1:13-cv03994); Complaint, Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-00851).
39
See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
40
Bart Forsyth, Banning Bulk: USA FREEDOM Act and Ending Bulk Collection, 72 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1307, 1334–39 (2015).
41
David S. Kris, The NSA and the USA FREEDOM Act, LAWFARE (July 2, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/nsa-and-usa-freedom-act [https://perma.cc/78NG-KZB5].
42
See PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 18, at 16.
43
PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 18, at 16.
44
PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 18, at 17; FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-238, 126 Stat. 1631; FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2017,
Pub. L. No. 115-118, 132 Stat. 3 (2018).
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to develop certain minimization45 procedures on the acquisition, retention, use, and
dissemination of 702 information, as well as targeting procedures.46 NSA runs two
primary programs under these authorities. The first, PRISM, is focused on Internet
collection and does not include telephone calls. The government sends a “selector,”
such as an email address, to a U.S.-based electronics communications service
provider.47 The provider is then compelled to provide contents of all
communications sent to or from that selector. The second program is upstream
collection. This includes telephone calls and Internet communications. Such
collection involves the compelled assistance of companies controlling the
telecommunications “backbone” to release the contents of those communications
that transit through their networks to the government.48
C. The Evolution of the Foreign-Terrorist Threat
In its heyday, Al-Qaeda was a highly centralized foreign terrorist
organization with complex command and control structures. Al-Qaeda launched
meticulously planned attacks orchestrated by its leadership, with planners in
Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere providing detailed instructions to operatives
within target nations.49 Phone calls were the prime form of communication.50 Thus,
the CDR program, focused on contact chaining between known foreign terrorist
suspects and their U.S. agents, was quite valuable in discerning plots.
Al-Qaeda leadership’s desire to establish a transnational movement,
comprising foreign fighters and guided by outward-facing global agendas, posed a
new type of terrorism threat. Osama bin Laden had a strong sense of how to run a
business. He built this movement along the lines of a multinational corporation with
him as CEO.51 His board oversaw each terrorist attack and ensured attackers
45
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received proper training in Al-Qaeda’s training facilities.52 In light of Al-Qaeda’s
structure, it is clear why the 2003 U.S. “National Strategy for Combatting
Terrorism” concluded that all terrorists “must have a physical base from which to
operate.”53 The strategy saw international terrorism as pyramidal. At the top stood
highly centralized terrorist organizations with complex command and control
structures and leadership.54
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, targeting of Al-Qaeda’s leadership and
cutting down its terrorist financing channels, made it increasingly difficult for the
organization’s higher echelons to maintain the corporate structure.55 As Al-Qaeda
moved to empower more and more junior commanders to operate independently, it
risked rogue subordinates and complete breakdown of control. This was
exemplified by the Islamic State. To support the undertaking of a worldwide
caliphate, the Islamic State launched an online propaganda campaign aimed at
attracting foreign fighters. Al-Qaeda’s model had been to attract fighters, then
radicalize them upon their arrival. ISIS successfully used a “media mix of graphic
violence and attractive ideals” to attract recruits who then arrived already partially
radicalized, drawing the largest number of foreign fighters compared to any other
terrorist group in history. 56 Online radicalization enabled terrorist clickbait, which
could provide remote training as well as encourage recruits to commit terrorist
attacks. Radicalized online, perpetrators carried out these one-off attacks alone or
in a small partnership, without prior direction and control from ISIS-affiliated
leaders.
The gradual demise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq in the latter half of 2010s led
to a steady return of foreign terrorist fighters in Europe, intensifying a new kind of
domestic terrorist threat. The U.S. foreign-terrorist threat is different; the current
peril from returning foreign fighters is limited thus far.57 In 1994, the United States
outlawed foreign fighting in support of terrorism,58 much earlier than many other
nations.59 It is hard for American foreign fighters to return and thus potentially
reengage in terrorist activity. Compared to thousands of Europeans who went to
52
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Iraq and Syria to join ISIS, only about 300 Americans are said to have done the
same.60 The physical distance between the United States and the conflict also
limited the threat from veteran jihadis. Those seeking to return into the United
States to carry attacks undergo tight border restrictions and the scrutiny of airport
security. U.S. Customs and Border Protection authorities vet physical entry into the
United States; afterwards, domestic law enforcement is likely to monitor returnees
after entry into the country.61 Such monitoring is unlikely to rely on Section 215,
entry into the United States of a foreign terrorist fighter would constitute sufficient
suspicion to justify a traditional FISA warrant.
Since 2014, when the caliphate was formally declared, radicalized
homegrown lone wolves have run eight deadly attacks in the United States.62 In all
cases, attacks were conducted by individuals plugged into an “interactive
ecosystem” of propaganda and crowd-sourced jihad.63 Examining terrorist attacks
committed on U.S. soil between 2003–17, counterterrorism expert Christopher
Wright found that “the average cell size of those involved in these attacks is 1.2,
with the most frequent number involved in the attack being 1.”64 Terrorists were
not in significant contact with handlers from ISIS or other terrorist organizations.
As Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Director Christopher Wray observed:
The FBI assesses HVEs [homegrown violent extremists] are the
greatest terrorism threat to the Homeland. These individuals are
global jihad-inspired individuals who are in the U.S., have been
radicalized primarily in the U.S., and are not receiving
individualized directions from FTOs [foreign terrorist
organizations]. . . . This is a significant transformation from the
terrorist threat our Nation faced a decade ago.65
The evolution in the threat environment dramatically changes which
intelligence tools provide the greatest value. Current domestic terrorist attacks
within the United States are not directed, they are instigated. Domestic terrorists do
not leave behind a trail of telephony metadata breadcrumbs for the IC to follow
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because they are not in touch with any handlers—and certainly not by telephone.
Although the Section 215 program could once be used to map links between actors
in the United States and terrorist organizations outside the nation’s borders, the
likelihood that querying the USA FREEDOM Act (“UFA”) CDR program will
identify Internet-incited lone wolves is slim. Such a tool does not provide
investigative information on the operations of these homegrown violent extremists.
II. Issues Arise with the Use of The USA FREEDOM Act
At first it appeared that the transition to the UFA greatly improved the CDR
collection. Former NSA Deputy Director Rick Ledgett explained that the UFA
“transferred the compliance burden from NSA, which had to maintain the universe
of call data, to the telecommunications providers, who only had to give NSA those
contacts responsive to an authorized query.”66 The change gave the agency access
to additional providers and more data.67 Then two issues raised concerns. The first
was the scale—151 million CDRs collected in 2016 and 534 million in 2017—
which seemed high given the 40 orders issued each year.68 The second was NSA’s
June 2018 announcement that it was purging three years of records. This Article
examines how 40 targets might lead to collecting hundreds of millions of CDRs in
a single year and what might have led to the 2018 purge of records. 69 Necessarily
speculative, this discussion is nevertheless well grounded in the facts as they are
known.
A. Collecting CDRs
Following the Snowden disclosures, the IC began a multi-pronged effort for
transparency. In that spirit, NSA published an overview of the architecture used by
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the USA FREEDOM Act for CDR collection.70 Collection is based on selectors
such as an IMEI number, a 15-digit number that identifies a particular device71 or
phone number.72 To explain the role these identifiers play in collection, we start
with how the phone network works.
Though landline and mobile phone networks operate seamlessly together,
the naming convention—what a phone number means—is different for landline and
mobile telephones. In traditional landline phones, the phone number delineates the
end location of the “twisted pair” of wires that connect the phone to the telephone’s
central office. The central office is where the phone subscriber’s line is connected
to switching equipment that enables local calls and connections to long-distance
carriers.73 The twisted pair defines a phone’s address—its number—in an
apartment, an office (including a particular desk), etc. It is a physical location. By
contrast, a mobile phone number does not directly delineate a fixed physical
location. Instead fancy footwork within the mobile network, working with the
landline network with which it interoperates, connects a mobile number with the
phone’s current physical location.
For a landline—also known as a wireline phone—the phone number does
not identify the phone; a landline phone moved to a new location and plugged into
the wall has a different number.74 By contrast, a mobile phone “owns” its phone
number—the IMSI,75 carried on the device’s SIM card—and a mobile phone that
moves keeps its number. Changing ownership of a landline number is harder than
changing ownership of a mobile number. Replace a mobile’s SIM card and you
have a different IMSI76—but not a different IMEI77—while a landline device, the
account owner, and phone number have a relatively permanent relationship.
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A mobile phone has two addresses: the MS-ISDN and the IMSI number.
The MS-ISDN is the external identifier—the number a user gives when we ask for
their cell number. The IMSI is the phone’s identity on its “home” network and is
not shared except when the phone roams (more on this shortly). The MSISDN/IMSI pair delineates the phone itself, not its location.
Delivering calls to mobile devices results in the use of multiple identifiers:
IMSI, the phone number or account, and IMEI. This variety of mobile phone
identifiers provides investigators with interesting capabilities. While it is
understood that mobile phones check into their cell towers with the IMSI as the
user roams—that is, after all, how the phone alerts the network that “I am here;
route calls to me”—it is less well known that CDRs also collect phones’ IMEIs.78
This information can be quite useful. Hussain Osman, a terrorist involved in the
July 21, 2005, bomb attacks in London, fled to Rome having bought a new SIM
card for his phone.79 The phone had a new IMSI, but still had the same IMEI.
Authorities tracked Osman to his brother’s apartment via the records his cell phone
left through the network as he traveled.80
When the NSA becomes aware of a selector of interest, the agency checks
its archives to cross-reference it with other selectors (e.g., an MS-ISDN, an IMSI,
an IMEI number). These archives, however, are limited. They contain phone
records NSA acquired from previous searches under UFA and other authorities, but
do not include metadata NSA obtained through Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act prior to the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act81 nor data purged in the 2018
incident. For example, NSA determines whether it has records showing a particular
phone, for example named through its IMEI, already in the archives as connected
to a particular MS-ISDN, IMSI, etc. This is not about “hops”—which numbers have
been called by a particular number—it is about which phones or numbers have used
(or been used with) which numbers or phones. This step is accounted for in the
dashed green arrow that points in both directions between Phases 1 and 2 of Figure
1.
Phase 1 of the NSA CDR collection process involves obtaining FISC
approval that there is “reasonable and articulable suspicion” (“RAS”) that a specific
selector (or a set of associated selectors) is “associated with a foreign power, or an
agent of a foreign power, engaged in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefore.”82
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Figure 1: Architecture for USA FREEDOM Act Business Records FISA
Implementation83
Phase 2 of the process involves querying the providers and NSA’s own
archives for metadata within one hop and then two hops of the FISC-approved
selector.84 Under the USA FREEDOM Act, the one-hop, two-hop steps are done
automatically. This process is repeated periodically for the duration of the FISC
order so as to capture new CDRs within a two-hop maximum from a FISCapproved selector.85 NSA validates the result, storing it within a system called the
NSA Enterprise Architecture.86
Phase 3 is NSA’s processing and analysis of the collected information.
This stage is outside the realm of the technical side of collection and this Article
does not examine it.
B. Answering the “Easy” Question: If There Are Only 40 Orders Each Year,
Why Are So Many CDRs Collected?
Per the USA FREEDOM Act, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (“ODNI”) has released annual statistical transparency reports. The
reports for 2016 and 2017 show a total of 40 orders in each calendar year for CDRs
issued pursuant to applications under the business records provision.87 The
estimated number of CDRs arising from those 40 orders was high. ODNI suggested
that duplication occurs because different telecommunications companies produce
83
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CDRs for the same call event.88 With multiple selectors possible for each call, the
number of possible CDRs could result in many records for a single call. This part
examines how the CDR collection works in an effort to explain what appear to be
surprising statistics: an average of 3.75 million CDRs per order in 2016 and 13.3
million per order in 2017.
For simplicity of analysis, this part starts with the scenario that NSA
supplied:

Figure 2: NSA Call Event Hop Scenario and Method of Counting89
NSA discovers a selector for which the agency seeks a FISC order. Before
applying for an order, NSA checks the archive to determine if the selector is in the
archive. Suppose that the selector is not in the archive. Following the example
provided in Figure 2, if Phone A has made 500 calls each to Phones B and C, these
calls are likely to be recorded twice, once from A’s side and once from B or C’s
side. This yields two CDRs per call, one per carrier. If Phone A is outside the United
States, NSA might not receive the CDR held by the foreign carrier. Thus, after the
first hop, NSA has likely received between 1,000 and 2,000 records arising from
the 500 calls (for the purpose of this argument, assume 1,000). The CDRs returned
other potential selectors with the original one. For example, if the original selector
is an IMEI, then the CDRs will return an IMSI, account number, and perhaps a
calling card number used—not hopped to—by that IMEI. If NSA believes it could
demonstrate to the FISC that the target used the new selectors associated with the
IMEI, the agency would presumably request the associated selectors be added to
the original order. That provides a potential of 4 associated selectors multiplied by
1,000 calls being generated during the first hop, generating 4,000 CDRs. Incoming
communications also create CDRs. Assuming as many incoming calls as outgoing
calls—a reasonable assumption for consumer, non-marketing, non-fraud
numbers—this means the total number of CDRs arising from the first hop is 8,000.

88
89

See Records FISA Implementation Report, supra note 70, at 9.
See Statistical Transparency Report 2018, supra note 68, at 29.
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Phones B and C also give rise to selectors. According to the NSA
Transparency report, “selectors in direct contact with a RAS selector are validated,
combined with the RAS approved selectors and sent to the provider(s) as a
request.”90 One can expect up to 8 selectors from phones B and C. As shown in
Figure 2, phones D, E, F, and G receive 500 calls each. There are 2 phones (B and
C) with 4 selectors per phone, making 1,000 calls per phone and generating 2 CDRs
per call, for a total of 16,000 CDRs being generated from outgoing calls on the
second hop.91 Again, assuming that A receives the same number of incoming
second-hop calls as it makes, this creates a total of 32,000 CDRs from the incoming
plus outgoing second-hop calls. Thus starting with phone A calling 2 phones (B
and C), and phones B and C calling phones D and E, and F and G, respectively,
there are up to 40,000 CDRs generated from the first and second hops from A (this
is from 8,000 + 32,000). Note that implicit in this calculation is the assumption that
D, E, F, and G are not communicating directly with A. That is not a reasonable
assumption in analyzing social networks—your two close friends or family
members are likely to also know, and perhaps call, each other—but the targets
against whom NSA is collecting communicate differently.
So far, the sum of CDRs collected is solely for a 180-day period of the court
order. The order allows the collection of CDRs “going back in time.” That is, while
collection by the government may only occur during the 150-day period, the law
permits collection of all CDRs the telephone company has associated with that
selector. Because CDRs are the basis for business planning on telephone use,
companies may hold CDRs for a number of years. We estimate the companies NSA
queries retain three years’ worth of records.92 Instead of 180 days’ worth of CDRs,
there are likely six times that, or 240,000 CDRs returned. This substantial number
remains well below the 3.75 million per order that would explain the numbers NSA
has reported.
We do not know to what degree the example NSA provided is representative
of actual terrorist behavior. The 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri can provide insights. Hariri had resigned as Prime Minister
on October 20, 2004, intending to participate in regional elections six months later.
Instead he was assassinated on February 14, 2005, by a truck bomb that detonated
as his motorcade passed by.93
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The attack involved extensive planning. Examining Lebanese cell phone
records from the time of Hariri’s resignation as prime minister in October 20, 2004,
to his assassination on February 14, 2005, investigators discovered interesting
calling patterns. The assassination “team” had different cells: the “green” group had
18 phones, the “blue,” 15; the “yellow,” 13; and the “red,” 8.94 The green group
appeared to be the operational center of the team.95 This group’s leader only spoke
with two deputies and always only on green phones.96 These deputies, using phones
belonging to the other color groups, would then call a leader of the other color
group. A leader of the blue or yellow groups would call a member of the green
group on a green phone but communicate with blue or yellow group members on a
blue or yellow phone. Members of the group avoided using their “work” phones for
personal communications, instead they typically carried an additional personal
phone from which they made personal calls. Thus, deputies of the green group and
leaders of the various color groups carried at least three phones.97
Let us focus first on the personal phone. The purpose of plotters having a
personal phone to make calls was to prevent identifying the individuals in the plot.
Journalist Ronen Bergman reported: “[P]rosecutors say that same purple phone was
always in the same place as the green command-group phone that Merhi [the plotter
who ran the cover operation] carried.”98 From the point of view of counting CDRs,
these personal phones are important. Unlike those used in the plot, these phones
were used as phones to call or text a family member, to order furniture, or to arrange
to meet for dinner.
For simplicity, we assume a 100-day period for the phones rather than the
117 days between October 20 and February 14 (the phones stopped working after
the assassination). Consider the CDRs from the calls of the leader of the blue group,
B. We can assume that B spoke with the green deputy, G, once or twice a day during
the 100 days of the plot’s planning and execution. We assume that using his blue
phone, B spoke with other members of the blue group twice a day. This
combination of devices means that there were at least nine potential selectors
associated with the blue leader: three IMEIs, three IMSIs, three accounts (so as to
keep records of the three phones—green phone, blue phone, and personal phone—
separate). But there may have been more (e.g., possible calling card numbers for
the two “official” phones).
The next step is to count the number of anticipated CDRs that would result
from the first hop of the call emanating from the leader of the blue group. Say, on
average, that B had 1.5 incoming and outgoing calls, combined, per day with G.
That would give a total of 900 CDRs over the period (3 selectors for the green
phone x 1.5 calls per day x 100 days x 2 CDRs per call, assuming this time that
both carriers are domestic carriers). B also had 3,000 CDRs arising from calls with
94
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the blue group (3 selectors and 5 calls daily to his group of 15 on the blue phone,
for a total of 3 x 5 x 100 days x 2 CDRs per call). Finally, B used his personal phone
for friends and family. Assuming five calls a day, that would work out to 3,000
CDRs (3 selectors x 5 calls/day x 100 days x 2 CDRs/call). Further assuming that
the friends and family phone results in calls to 30 different numbers over the 100day period, a high but not unreasonable estimate, the total is 6,900 first-hop CDRs
over the 100-day period.
We can expect many more CDRs from the second hop and the compounding
effect of the number of B’s contacts. There are three sets of second hops. These
emanate from G, the members of the blue group, and B’s friends and family. We
examine each in turn.
Assuming that between calls to and from the green group’s leader and calls
to and from the leaders of the various color groups, G made five calls a day, this
contributed 3,000 CDRs (3 selectors x 5 calls/day x 100 days x 2 CDRs per call)
on a combination of his green and blue phones. G made calls on his personal phone;
as with B’s personal phone, assuming that these constituted 3,000 CDRs (3
selectors x 5 calls/day x 100 days x 2 CDRs/call), the contribution of CDRs
generated from the second-hop communications emanating from G is 6,000.
There are fifteen members of the blue group. We conservatively assume that
aside from B, members of the blue group carry a blue one and a personal one. If we
assume that members of the blue group made 4 calls a day within the group, there
are 36,000 CDRs (15 people x 3 selectors per person x 4 calls/day x 100 days x 2
CDRs per call). The contribution of the personal phones of the fifteen members of
the blue group is 3,000 CDRs per person x 15 people, or 45,000 CDRs over the 100
days. Thus, the total CDR second-hop contribution from the blue group is 81,000
CDRs.
Finally, there are “friends and family” of the blue deputy. This creates the
substantial expansion of CDR records. In a 100-day period, B’s 30 “friends and
family” each may have had three selectors and made about 500 calls during the
period. Accordingly, that is an additional contribution of 90,000 CDRs (30 people
x 3 selectors/person x 5 calls/day x 100 days x 2 CDRs per call). Summing up, this
adds up to 171,000 CDRs from the second hop or a total of about 177,000 CDRs
from the first two hops.
The calculation for 177,000 CDRs was for a 100-day period. Extending the
same calling patterns to a 180-day period (the length that a FISC order permits),
the length of time of a FISC Section 215 order, that would come to 318,600. That
is still not 3.75 million CDRs per order that NSA reported for 2016. Indeed, it is
under a tenth of the number of CDRs per order that NSA reported for 2016.
The calculations above made assumptions here about how the phones are
used—how many calls are made per day and how many different numbers are
called—but the assumptions are reasonable. In fact, the assumptions may lead to
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underestimates of the number of CDRs produced from calls by the various phones.
If one imagines that one of B’s “friends and family” calls is to a popular number—
a doctor’s office, for example—the growth in CDRs from the second hop is much
higher. The earlier CDR collection program carried out under the USA PATRIOT
Act employed a master “defeat” list to “block the ingest of, or purge already
ingested unwanted information.”99
High-volume identifiers such as telemarketers are problematic because they
indiscriminately “touch” many users, amplifying the collateral reach of the NSA
when caught in a hop. There are three steps to handling the CDRs: collection, query,
and dissemination.100 While there are privacy interests in all three—even the
perception that one’s CDRs may be collected can create a chilling effect—a
collected CDR that is never examined, and thus never disseminated, impinges on
privacy less than one that is.
NSA’s UFA implementation performs the second hop automatically. If a
high-volume number directly connects with a selector belonging to a target, NSA
collects the CDRs between the high-volume identifier and its connections. CDRs
related to high-volume identifiers are just dead ends. As such, NSA has little
interest in collecting them. But since these high-volume identifiers shift frequently,
NSA cannot necessarily identify a high-volume identifier before the second hop,
for it is the second hop that reveals the high-volume nature of the identifiers.
A declassified 2014 FISC opinion states:
An authorized technician may access the [Business Records]
metadata to ascertain those identifiers that may be high volume
identifiers [such as telemarketers]. The technician may share the
results of any such access, i.e., the identifiers and the fact that they
are high volume identifiers, with authorized personnel (including
those responsible for the identification and defeat of high volume
and other unwanted BR metadata from any of NSA’s various
metadata repositories).101
As the FISC opinion indicates, it appears that NSA then determines which
are high-volume identifiers. It is likely safe to assume that those CDRs involving
the high-volume identifiers are not examined—and certainly not disseminated.
While the terrorists who carried out the Hariri assassination do not appear
to have shifted between different SIM cards, phones, and accounts for the same
communication channels (as opposed to using different phones for different
99

See LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS OFF., MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF DIRECTOR OF THE HOUSE PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE FROM NSA DEPUTY ASSOCIATED DIRECTOR 2 (June 29,
2009).
100
National Research Council’s Bulk SIGINT Collection Report, supra note 10, at 29.
101
See In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 14-67, at 6 (FISA Ct. Mar. 28, 2014).

330
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 11
subgroups of the plot), many terrorists do so. The NSA program, CO-TRAVELER,
uses mobile phone data to track users in real time. For this reason, CO-TRAVELER
is of particular use in discovering people in close proximity to an individual.102 COTRAVELER can also be used to discover whether a target is using a burner phone.
Each discovery of this sort increases the number of selectors associated with a
particular target. For example, if the initial selector is an IMEI, it might be
associated with two different IMSIs. These, in turn, might be associated with two
different IMEIs and three different calling card numbers. If a single target is using
these different IMEIs, IMSIs, and calling card numbers, then the collection would
fall under a single order.103 If the people with whom the target is communicating
are doing the same, then the number of CDRs grows exponentially even for a twohop collection.
The Hariri assassination involved many members of a highly structured
terrorist organization planning over many months and may not be representative of
the cases of radicalized lone wolves being investigated today. But the lessons from
the Hariri case, in conjunction with Figure 2, can guide our understanding. If a
target is using a phone to call only two other numbers, then it is likely that, just as
in the Hariri case, the target also has a phone from which he makes personal calls
to various parties. The collection from the two hops emanating from the target’s
“terrorist phone” may result in 24,000 CDRs; how many CDRs may come from the
terrorist’s personal phone?
Calculating this number requires knowing the median number of unique
numbers a person may connect to over a 180-day period and the median number of
times they do so (this Article uses “median” since the average number is heavily
skewed upwards by the number of outgoing calls made by calling centers,
robocalls, and the like). Determining these numbers is quite challenging.
First and foremost is the rate of change of communications technologies.
For at least sixty years, the telephone was the preferred method of electronic
communication. Communications technologies now change in a matter of years, if
not months. Because IP-based messaging applications—e.g., iMessage, WhatsApp,
Messenger—are often limited to a single platform, adoption of technologies can
occur in Internet time. Widespread use may occur in a matter of months.
Telephone companies have precise data about use of voice calls and text.
However, given their general unwillingness to share that information publicly, there
are gaps in the literature regarding text and voice usage. While there is information
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on mean and median use of text by Americans,104 minutes of voice call use annually
by Americans,105 and U.S. teens’ use of SMS,106 studies fail to show how many
unique people Americans call or text in a month, what the mean and median usage
of phone calls are, and what those numbers are once spammers and robocallers are
removed from the data set. This Article has made reasonable estimates about
available data and used these estimates to provide some educated guesses on usage.
These estimates include CDRs for telephone calls and SMS.107 Sometimes
“texting” is used to denote both SMS and text messaging applications such as
iMessage and WhatsApp, but text messaging applications are IP-based
communications.108 It appears that IP-based messaging applications are not
collected under Section 215 authorities, an issue discussed in Section III.C.1. Let
us explain our assumptions.
To calculate the number of CDRs generated by the use of a personal phone,
it is necessary to ascertain the median number of calls plus SMS texts a person
might make daily and the number of “unique” connections for those
communications—the number of different outgoing numbers used for these calls
plus SMS texts. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2010, among adults who
used mobile phones for calls and SMS texts, the daily median for receiving and
making calls was five, and the daily median for receiving and sending texts was
ten.109 These numbers were notably higher for young people; 18- to 24-year-olds
had a mean of 110 texts per day and a median of 50; 25- to 34-year-olds showed a
mean of 49 and a median of 20 texts daily.110 A similar Pew study in 2015 echoed
high use of texts by young adults.111 CTIA, an industry association, observed that
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in 2016, Americans sent and received 1.99 trillion texts (combined SMS and MMS
multimedia texts sent via the cellular network) yearly,112 or approximately 22 daily.
The last number needed before calculating is the median or mean number
of unique contacts for users within a fixed time period. That number is not readily
available for the U.S. population, but a 2013 study of users of a Chinese telecom
provider found the number of unique outgoing contacts for phone calls to be rather
surprising: 245 over a two-part, four-month period in 2010 (June 28, 2010–July 24,
2010 and October 1, 2010–December 31, 2010, with some unexplained missing
days).113 The fact that the number is just for phone calls means that it
underestimates calls plus SMS texts. Researchers first sifted the telecom data so
that the study considered only the 100,000 most active cellphone users—that is,
those with the largest number of outgoing calls. They then filtered the data to
eliminate users conducting robocalls, telecom sales, or telecom frauds (such users
are recognizable by a high number of outgoing calls and almost no incoming ones).
Thus, 245 denotes communications between people who know each other at some
level, not sales calls or otherwise inflated numbers.
We are ready to calculate the number of CDRs resulting from A’s personal
phone. We do this twice, providing a low estimate using conservative estimates of
how many calls and SMS are sent to how many unique contacts and a high estimate
using more generous numbers. We remind the reader of the greater use of the
telephone network—calls plus SMS—by young people. As we discuss at greater
length in Section III.A, the most serious foreign-influenced terrorist threat in the
United States arises from home-grown violent extremists; their ages almost
inevitably lie in the 18-to-34 range.
Because the targets are within this demographic group, when doing
estimates, it is reasonable to base numbers on the higher use this age range enjoys.
Even when we estimate conservatively, we can assume that A makes and receives
at least ten calls or SMS texts daily, and, over the first 30 days of the 180-day order,
contacts at least 10 unique numbers (3 family members, 2 people from work, and 5
others from a combination of friends). The period of collection is 180 days.114
The number of CDRs generated during the first hop of A’s personal phone
is 7,200 (4 selectors of A’s phone x 10 daily incoming and outgoing
communications x 180 days). By assuming that the calls from B and C are domestic,
we can assume that NSA will collect twice as many CDRs from B and C’s first
112
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hops. That is, the above will be multiplied by 2 CDRs per call, for a total of 14,400
CDRs on the first hop of their personal phones (these form the second hop from
A’s device).
A’s second hop on her personal phone will create larger numbers. Each of
the ten unique outgoing contacts will generate their own set of CDRs. In our
conservative estimate, we will assume A does not connect with these contacts until
day 30 of the 180-day period. The number of CDRs in the second hop of A’s
personal phone is 120,000 CDRs over the time period (10 contacts x 4 selectors
each x 10 communications a day x 150 days x 2 CDRs per communication).
Combined with the 7,200 records contributed by A’s first hop, and the 14,400
records contributed by the first hops of B and C, we have 156,000 CDRs for the
time period, a number that is far from the average number of 3.75 million CDRs
per target that NSA reported collecting.
Let us now try this using more generous estimates on A, B, and C’s use of
their phones. We assume that A, an NSA target, is in the age range of heavy use of
calls and SMS, of which she does forty a day (a conservative number). Recall the
2010 study found gregarious users contacted 245 unique numbers in a three-month
period. We underestimate this figure and assume that the U.S. user only contacts
50 unique numbers in the 180-day period. During the first hop of A’s personal
phone, the related CDR collection will be 4 selectors of A’s phone x 80 daily
incoming and outgoing communications x 180 days, or 57,600 CDRs. B and C will
also create 115,200 CDRs on their first hop (A’s second hop) since, as before, their
calls are assumed to be domestic and will thus generate two domestic CDRs per
call.
A’s second hop will produce a much larger number of CDRs. We will
assume that A’s contacts are similarly gregarious and do a combination of eighty
calls or SMS texts incoming and outgoing per day. We estimate that A’s 50
outgoing contacts will produce CDRs from 4 selectors each x 80 communications
a day x 180 days x 2 CDRs, or 5,760,000 CDRs over the time period. Combined
with the 56,400 records x 3 contributed by the first hops of each of A, B, and C, we
have 6,048,000 CDRs for the time period, a number that is 1.6 times as much the
3.75 million CDRs that NSA reported.
Our numbers changed strikingly between the two estimates due to our
estimate of the fifty unique outgoing contacts in a thirty-day period. The number of
CDRs NSA collects appear to be high for a somewhat different reason. In 2019,
NSA reported the number of unique identifiers from the 2018 CDR program:
19,372,544 phone numbers associated with 7,285,362 IMSIs and 5,305,578
IMEIs.115 This works out to 1,761,140 phones, 662,305 IMSIs, and 482,325 IMEIs
reached within two hops of a target (there were only 11 targets in 2018116). Even if
A is highly gregarious and uses multiple phones and SIM cards—and A’s contacts
115
116
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behave similarly—we cannot account for such large numbers. But, as NSA has
explained, “CDRs provided to the government include call events with business
entities, such as calls for marketing purposes.”117 Telemarketers make an enormous
number of outgoing calls; this could easily explain the anomalously large number
of unique identifiers reported in the 2018 Transparency Report. This also explains
the anomaly of nineteen million phone numbers associated with over seven million
IMSIs and over five million IMEIs. The discrepancy between these number—
nineteen million phone numbers but just seven million IMSIs and five million
IMEIs—is almost certainly due to spoofed telephone numbers, a scheme often
employed by telemarketers.118
The 250% growth of the CDR collection between 2016 and 2017 may have
a simple answer: NSA had more data to compare in 2017 than it did in 2016. NSA
CDR collection in 2016 queried metadata that the agency had collected under other
authorities; queries in 2017 were also compared against the CDRs NSA had
acquired in 2016, some undoubtedly containing selectors “associated” with a
selector for which NSA was seeking FISC approval. It would not take a high
number of such matches to drive the collection from 151 million in 2016 to 534
million in 2017.
C. Answering the “Hard” Question: What Went Wrong?
The “math problem” around the large number of CDRs produced was not
the sole fly in the ointment. On May 23, 2018, NSA began deleting all CDRs
acquired since 2015 under its UFA-amended FISA authorities. NSA announced
that it was:
[D]eleting the CDRs because several months ago NSA analysts
noted technical irregularities in some data received from
telecommunications service providers. These irregularities also
resulted in the production to NSA of some CDRs that NSA was not
authorized to receive. Because it was infeasible to identify and
isolate properly produced data, NSA concluded that it should not
use any of the CDRs.119
This statement is an enigma wrapped inside a mystery.120 What were the
irregularities? Why was it “infeasible to identify and isolate properly produced
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data”? Significant speculation arose, including that NSA had been receiving
location data.121
We believe that the problem lies with data from Mobile Switching Centers
(“MSC”), which is where calls from mobile devices enter the Public Switched
Telephone Network (“PSTN”). This explanation fits both NSA’s public statements
about the data purge and what Rebecca Richards, Civil Liberties and Privacy
Officer of the NSA, told us: “[the] record on its face did not look like it had a
problem, but a comparison with other records [showed] it had a problem”; she
added that analysts “[couldn’t] on the face identify a problem” with the CDRs.122
Using a phone is such a mundane aspect of daily life that few consider how
the network tracks a user across the globe, enabling real-time conversation
regardless of whether the speakers are using landlines, satellite phones, mobile
devices, or, most recently, IP-based devices. While this increasingly complex
system may make a connection, the network does not always correctly report the
connection ends. This requires understanding some technicalities of telephone
networks.
The phone network developed at a time when it was impossible to put any
complexity into the end-user devices—the phones—themselves; instead, switches
handled the complexity of connecting calls. First run by human operators, 123 they
are now controlled by software. AT&T led the effort to develop “Common Channel
interoffice signaling,” the international version of which is CCITT Signaling
System 6, adopted in 1975.124 This system separates the call’s management—the
signaling that initiates and ends a call—from its communications channel. By the
mid 1990s, both began being replaced by Signaling System 7 (“SS#7”), which
handles international roaming.125
We start with the simplest version of phone networks: the PSTN used for
landlines. It is easy to imagine that the phone number is the name of the phone at a
particular location, but it is actually a program “to build a path to the phone.”126
When the receiver on a landline is picked up, this sends a signal to the local phone
exchange. This exchange, called a central office, then generates a dial tone.
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Once a number has been dialed, switches in the central office (the nearest
phone office) determine how to route the call. As one of us explained in an earlier
work, in a landline:
[i]f the call is local . . . then the switches at the central office need to
determine which trunk line, or communications channel, should use
to route the call to an appropriate intermediate telephone exchange.
This new exchange repeats the process, but this time connects to the
recipient’s local exchange . . . . The local exchange determines if the
recipient’s line is free; if so, it ‘rings’ the line. If the recipient
answers, her receiver closes a circuit to the local exchange, which
establishes the call. The speakers have a fixed circuit for the call, the
one that was created during the call set up.127
Long distance—or, more precisely, calls made to outside an area code—
and international calls work similarly; for instance, the “1” of a long-distance
number signals the local switch to connect to the switch used by the caller’s longdistance carrier. The carrier’s switches connect to the local exchange for the call’s
recipient. From there on, everything works as before: the local exchange checks if
the recipient’s line is free, rings the line, and establishes a communications circuit
if someone answers the other end. The country code and area code (outside of the
United States and Canada, this is instead the country code and city code) similarly
connect to the appropriate exchanges.
Telephone networks are “backwards compatible”; old phone systems must
work even as new ones are introduced. Thus, the stolid black rotary telephone that
sends analogue dialing pulses to the phone network must be accommodated—even
though switching technology began the move to digital more than forty years ago.
Similarly, the cellular network interoperates with the landline system, requiring
some fancy footwork to make this happen.128
The first aspect of this interoperability is the Mobile Switching Center
(“MSC”), the cellular network’s equivalent of the central office.129 Information
about a mobile user is stored in a Home Location Register, an enormous database
127
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containing the mobile phone information for hundreds of thousands of
subscribers.130 Assignment to a Home Location Register is dependent on the SIM
card and is based on the IMSI number.131 The Home Location Register stores
subscriber information including the services to which the user is entitled.132
As a user roams, if her phone is turned on, it signals “I’m here, I’m here”
and passes its IMSI and IMEI on to the visited cellular network;133 this is
“registration.”134 The local Base Transceiver Station picks up the signal135 and
sends the registration information to a Base Station Controller, which may control
tens to hundreds of Base Transceiver Stations.136 The BSC allocates radio
frequencies and assigns roaming phones to appropriate Base Tranceiver Stations.137
The MSC connects the cellular network and the PSTN, with which it communicates
via SS#7.
The MSC checks to see if the subscriber is in its Home Location Register.
If not, the MSC queries its Visiting Location Register, a database that stores user
information while the user is roaming within the area of the associated MSC, to
determine whether the phone is registered.138 If it is, the phone is now ready to go;
if it is not, using SS#7, the visited MSC connects to the phone’s Home Location
Register to determine to which services the roaming subscriber is entitled. There
may be no business agreement between the subscriber’s network and the one in
which she is roaming or the user may not have arranged for service in the roaming
location. In that case, the user cannot receive or make calls.
If the subscriber is entitled to service, the visited MSC informs the visitor’s
Home Location Register of the cluster of cells by which the visitor is currently
served and updates this information approximately every thirty minutes (this is how
the Home Location Register knows where the user is and thus where to route calls).
The MSC constructs a temporary ID, the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
(“TMSI”), for the user; this serves to protect the subscriber’s IMSI against
eavesdroppers who might be trying to track the caller over the air interface between
the phone and the tower.139 Depending on the cell provider, the TMSI can change
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frequently (e.g., after every call) or much less so (e.g., after several days).140 The
TMSI is conveyed to the Base Station Controller and Base Transceiver Station—
but no farther. In particular, the visitor’s home MSC and Home Location Register
never learn the TMSI. The registration message and location update messages
between the MSCs, Home Location Register, and Visitor Location Register use the
IMSI as the roaming phone’s identifying number.141
Suppose Bob in the United States dials Alice, whose Home Location
Register is in New York but who is currently in Paris. Bob calls using Alice’s MSISDN, the number he has for Alice’s mobile. Alice’s MS-ISDN has been set up to
work on either system. The SS#7 signaling channel routes the call to Alice’s home
MSC, which queries Alice’s Home Location Register about reaching Alice. Alice’s
Home Location Register does a conversion from Alice’s MS-ISDN to Alice’s
IMSI; for the rest of the communication, only Alice’s IMSI will be used (and not
her MS-ISDN). With Alice’s IMSI as identifier, Alice’s Home Location Register
checks with the MSC that Alice has been visiting: is Alice still there?
If yes, the visited MSC sends Alice’s Home Location Register a number to
connect to Alice. This is not the TMSI assigned to Alice; instead, the visited MSC
sends a Mobile Station Roaming Number (MSRN) created just for this call.142 The
MSRN has the same format as Alice’s MS-ISDN—country code followed by area
code143 followed by “office code” (the MSC) followed by a four-digit “line
number.” Alice’s Home Location Register must use the MSRN within ten seconds;
otherwise the period of validity for the MSRN elapses.
Alice’s home MSC connects the call between Alice and Bob using Alice’s
MSRN and Bob’s number, which may well be Bob’s MS-ISDN. Why is Bob’s MSISDN used—and, more particularly—included in the connection? It may be that
Alice wants Caller ID, making Bob’s MS-ISDN necessary. When the call signaling
reaches Paris, the MSC completes the call using Alice’s IMSI (which it has
associated with the 10-second MSRN it sent to New York). Alice and Bob start
chatting.
Consider what CDR information is being stored at the MSCs. The New
York MSC knows Alice’s MS-ISDN, Alice’s MSRN, and Bob’s MS-ISDN. The
New York MSC can keep the records in a number of ways: in terms of Alice’s MSISDN and Bob’s MS-ISDN, in terms of MSRN used for the call and Bob’s MSISDN, or in terms of both Alice’s MS-ISDN and the MSRN used for the call from
Bob to Alice. The Paris MSC knows Alice’s IMSI and probably Bob’s MS-ISDN
(whether it does depends on whether the New York MSC has forwarded it), but is
not given Alice’s MS-ISDN on an incoming call. The critical point is that whatever
140
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CDR the Paris MSC creates for the call from Bob to Alice does not include Alice’s
MS-ISDN, for Paris does not know it.

Figure 3: International Mobile Calling: Showing Switches and Connections144
In other words, no one place in the network has full information about which
number is connecting to which; each MSC has only partial information, albeit
sufficient partial information to enable the connection. CDRs collected in one place
(e.g., the New York MSC) may well show different numbers connecting in a
different place (e.g., the Paris MSC). If the CDR collected is showing an incorrect
number, subsequent CDRs will be collected against the wrong number, but that the
record held an incorrect number will not be obvious from the CDR itself.
Recall Richards’s comment that, “[the] record on its face did not look like
it had a problem, but a comparison with other records [showed] it had a
problem.”145 An incorrect CDR stemming from the fact that different parts of the
network know different pieces of the connection would explain why comparing the
records with other records demonstrated a problem. Our explanation fits with
Richards’s statement that the record looked fine “on its face.” It also fits the issue
that an incorrect record happens sometimes, not all the time or even frequently.
Other explanations proffered for the problem with collection, including that some

We include International Gateways (“IG”), National Transit Switches (“NTS”), Local Transit
Switches (“LTS”), and local network’s Central Offices (“CO”) in this diagram; these are all part of
the phone network. In the interest of diagram simplicity, we do not have all possible configurations
(including the connections between “Another Nation” and France).
145
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CDRs included location information, would not look fine “on its face.”146 Our
analysis fits the known facts and how switching technology works.
A critical nuance may be what NSA said, namely that it was infeasible to
isolate properly produced data. The agency did not say it was impossible to do so
and refused to answer why when asked. It seems very likely that the program ended
because it no longer had much value.
III. The Effectiveness of the CDR Program in Light of the Changing
Communications Environment
We now examine how foreign-inspired terrorists have operated within the
United States over the past five years and show how the evolution in foreign
terrorist communication has shifted the way the IC conducts counterterrorism
investigations.
A. How Methods of Communications Have Evolved
Over the last two decades, we have seen a dramatic change in electronic
communications, one that continues to evolve at an unprecedented rate. Three
particular changes stand out: (1) worldwide adoption of cellular communication in
the 2000s; (2) use of mobile and SMS-text inside the United States; and (3) the
subsequent move to smartphones and IP-based communications.
Worldwide adoption of mobile communications took off between 2000 and
2010. In Yemen, for example, the number of mobile phone subscriptions grew from
fewer than 1 in 500 people in 2000 to 47 in 100 in 2010.147 A similar trend occurred
in other countries of importance to U.S. counter-terrorism intelligence operations.
In 2000, the number of subscriptions per 100 people stood at zero in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Libya.148 By 2010, those numbers had shifted significantly to 35 in 100,
55 in 100, and 177 in 100, respectively.149 With few exceptions, the rest of the
developing world saw similarly rapid growth.
With this new technology, the signaling message is picked up along with
the call. The missed connection between Yemen and San Diego in 2001 by U.S.
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board confirmed this: “[W]hen receiving CDRs
from providers, NSA’s validation checks could detect if a provider had accidentally sent additional
data fields forbidden by the statute, such as subscriber name or cell-site location information.”
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT’S USE OF THE
CALL DETAIL RECORDS PROGRAM UNDER THE USA FREEDOM ACT 48 (Feb. 2020),
https://www.pclob.gov/library/PCLOB%20USA%20Freedom%20Act%20Report%20(Unclassifie
d).pdf [https://perma.cc/XXP2-96EM] [hereinafter Government’s Use of the CDRs].
147
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 people), WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS.P2?locations=AF-IQ-LY&veiw=chart
[https://perma.cc/RUZ6-VHHA] (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).
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intelligence was an artifact of an old switching technology. The new infrastructure
included phone technology that, had it been in use in 2001, would have revealed
the number of the other end of the communication calling the Al-Qaeda safe house
in Sana.
The United States also experienced the growth of cell-phone technology
during the period between 2000 and 2010. Cellular subscriptions grew from 62%
of the population in 2002 to 85% by 2010, while voice calls over the phone network
declined.150 The shift continued into the 2010s, with texting becoming the preferred
means of communications for those aged 18 to 34.151 Use of social media created
virtual communities and networks and the last decade has seen a move towards IPbased applications. In 2010, such applications were largely on the desktop, but
smartphones have enabled people to stay connected at all times—while waiting for
lunch, before a movie, in a taxi—thereby increasing the number of daily IP-based
communications and user-generated content.
By 2016, smartphones and tablet devices surpassed desktop computers as
the primary means of going online.152 As of 2019, 81% of all American owned a
smartphone, with “roughly one-in-five American adults [being] ‘smartphone-only’
Internet users.”153 The transition to IP-based communications significantly
increases the amount and type of data generated; at the same time a changing
technological landscape decreases the value of CDRs. Use of voice calls is
dropping; the wireless trade association, CTIA, reports a decrease in number of
minutes of use between 2015 and 2016,154 and that trend is continuing. Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) Commissioner Michael O’Rielly reports:
“Many of the legacy wireless cellphone functions are being overtaken by Internet
apps, such as Skype, FaceTime, WhatsApp and Facebook messenger.”155 Consider
the following two examples.
The messaging app iMessage contacts an Apple server whenever a new
phone number is used.156 The server then determines whether to route through
Apple’s iMessaging system as an IP-communication or over the public-switched
telephone network as an SMS text. If the communication is IP-based, then the user
will see blue bubbles; if it is an SMS text, the user will see green ones. Apple
collects metadata around those queries, recording each number or IP address, date,
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and time of the communication.157 Apple stores this information for 30 days.158
Apple is headquartered and registered in the United States and is thus subject to the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Thus, the company could be presented with “pen
register” or “trap and trace” court orders seeking to acquire this metadata. The CDR
program could only be useful in collecting metadata around the “green” messaging,
which go over the PSTN network. The blue bubbles represent IP-based
communications that are therefore outside of the telephony CDR collection (this
limitation appears to be a decision of the IC rather than a legal requirement; see
Section III.c.1).
On the other end of the spectrum are applications such as Telegram, which
allows for “secret chats” that are end-to-end encrypted so that only the sender and
receiver can read the message. The secret chats leave no information, support selfdestruction (the message is deleted from the recipient’s device after a fixed time),
and do not allow the recipient to forward the message (nothing prevents the
recipients from retyping and sending of course).159 Messages are not stored on
Telegram’s cloud and can only be accessed on their devices of origin.160 Telegram
stores the user phone’s contact lists on its server. This challenge of collection
against Telegram is not only technological, but also jurisdictional, as the company
operates from Dubai.161
These examples highlight how evolving IP-based applications make CDR
collection less useful.
B. How Terrorist Methods of Communications Have Evolved
A useful example to consider is that of the perpetrators of the Garland Texas
shooting. On May 3, 2015, Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi opened fire outside the
Garland Curtis Culwell Center, which was hosting an exhibit of images mocking
the prophet Muhammad.162 Both attackers were promptly shot and killed by an offduty police officer guarding the center.163 ISIS later claimed responsibility for this
attack.164 But there are no indications that ISIS members had actually instructed the
157
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perpetrators to carry out the attack or provided them with material support beyond
mere encouragement and inspiration over social media and encrypted messaging
apps.165
In the days before the attack, Mohammed Abdullahi Hassan, an American
in Somalia who had been contributing to ISIS’s online radicalization efforts,
tweeted a link to the exhibit calling on jihadists to follow the example set by the
Charlie Hebdo shooters.166 Simpson responded to Hassan’s tweet by suggesting “if
there were jihadists like that in the U.S., people would not draw Mohammed.”167
In March 2015, Simpson had begun corresponding with ISIS recruiter
Junaid Hussain.168 The men started on Twitter, then switched to SureSpot, an open
source end-to-end encrypted messaging application.169 Hussain seemingly showed
early knowledge of an impending strike and would later boast about the fact that
through his communications with Simpson he “helped direct the attack.”170
The Simpson case exemplifies what has become the typical process of
radicalization through online communication undertaken by most homegrown
domestic terrorists in the United States. Social media is traditionally the launching
pad for this process. At the height of the caliphate, in 2014, the ISIS social media
wing ran at least 46,000 Twitter accounts, with 20% of all followers of these
accounts designating English as their primary language.171 ISIS relied on
intermediaries, some of whom operated from within the United States and
connected ISIS radicalizers with Americans showing potential interest in carrying
out attacks on U.S. soil.172 As the Simpson case highlights, a mere response or
retweet could be enough for ISIS to focus attention on a specific individual with an
eye towards recruitment. Once an initial correspondence begins, communications
usually transition from the public platform to an encrypted messaging app.
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ISIS has relied heavily on apps such as WhatsApp, Surespot, Viber,
Telegram, and Signal.173 Telegram channels allow for mass propagation of news
from the caliphate to targeted audiences, which becomes useful when Twitter
accounts become vulnerable to stricter takedown efforts.174 Some apps are not only
end-to-end encrypted, but also provide users with the ability to send messages with
a self-destruct timer. ISIS recruiters attend to communications security. Hussain,
for example, would ask potential recruits to switch from Kik to Surespot; Kik did
not offer end-to-end encryption, while SureSpot did.175 Erick Jamal Hendricks,
another online ISIS recruiter, tried various techniques to avoid detection. For
example, he frequently changed his online handles on messaging apps and placed
spaces between letters in texts.176
Recruiters are open to experimenting with new apps that might provide
greater security. Beginning in mid-December 2018, ISIS-linked media groups
suggested using RocketChat, an open-source messaging system for mobile and
desktop systems.177 In December 2018 an ISIS-related organization published a
technical manual that demonstrated how to install and anonymously use
RocketChat.178
In addition to social media and encrypted communications with recruiters,
homegrown terrorists rely on the Internet to conduct research for their attacks. Zale
Thompson, the hatchet-wielding man who attacked several police officers in
Queens, NY in 2014 visited at least 277 sites connected to Al-Qaeda, ISIS, or jihad,
in the nine months leading to the attack.179 Faisal Mohammad visited multiple ISIS
and other extremist websites in the weeks prior to stabbing people at the University
of California, Merced.180 Online research often leads to the identification of certain
training materials published in jihadi magazines such as Inspire and Dabiq.181
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In late 2018, FBI Director Wray described some of the investigatory
challenges of such attacks:
We, along with our law enforcement partners, face significant
challenges in identifying and disrupting homegrown violent
extremists. This is due, in part, to their lack of a direct connection
with a foreign terrorist organization, an ability to rapidly mobilize,
and the use of encrypted communications. In recent years, prolific
use of social media by foreign terrorist organizations has greatly
increased their ability to disseminate their messages. We have also
been confronting a surge in terrorist propaganda and training
available via the Internet and social media. Due to online
recruitment and indoctrination, foreign terrorist organizations are no
longer dependent on finding ways to get terrorist operatives into the
United States to recruit and carry out acts of terrorism. Terrorists in
ungoverned spaces – both physical and cyber – readily disseminate
propaganda and training materials to attract easily influenced
individuals around the world to their cause. They motivate these
individuals to act at home or encourage them to travel.182
The IC faces a new challenge trying to prevent attacks by violent-prone
individuals who follow an online radical template. These lone-wolf attackers might
not be capable of joining a terrorist organization, but they answer ISIS’s call to
carry out attacks deep in the heart of western societies.
C. How Investigative Methods Have Evolved in Light of the New
Communications Environment
1. The Decline in the Utility of CDRs
As the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (“PCLOB”) noted in
2014, the Section 215 CDR program “is not utilized in a vacuum.” 183 The move
towards IP-based communication by terrorists, including social media and
encrypted communications, highlights the reasons for the reduction in efficacy of
traditional CDRs. The USA Freedom Act’s value can only be understood when
compared to capabilities other legal authorities provide to the IC; this includes
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signals intelligence NSA captures under Section 702, Executive Order 12333,184
and traditional wiretaps. To this growing menu, one might add more traditional FBI
techniques: 48% of all lone-wolf attackers in the United States are monitored by
FBI informants, 26% are implicated through a tip from family or community
members, while 9% come through a tip from the general public.185
Former PCLOB Executive Director Sharon Bradford Franklin has argued
that, based on the language of the law, the CDR program could encompass metadata
from encrypted messaging apps.186 There is no public information on this, but we
do not believe it is occurring. Our rationale is based on practicality. In 2011, the
NSA discontinued a program to collect metadata from email communications “for
operational and resource reasons.”187 The USA FREEDOM Act program is quite
stringent—notably more so than the authorities under which the CDR program was
working in 2011. IP-based communications applications are far more complex than
PSTN-based ones—and they are constantly changing. Applying the USA
FREEDOM Act to IP-based communications would require specific authorizations
for every protocol and app. In a world of ever-changing IP-based
communications—new ones developed seemingly weekly—obtaining FISC
approval for each new application is complex and time consuming.
It seems far more likely that Section 702’s authorities for the collection of
the metadata and content of Internet communications offer far greater flexibility in
addressing these pressing needs. This is also the view of independent journalist
Marcy Wheeler.188 Note, though, that there is not a direct trade of 702 authorities
for those of 215. Targets under Section 702 cannot include U.S. persons or people
located in the US, while they can under Section 215.
The Section 215 CDR program in its current structure thus seems to provide
a decreasing value in the investigation of international terrorism. Indeed, in 2019,
the NSA told the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board that “traditional telephony data,
like that obtained under the CDR program, was unlikely to show a terrorist’s
184
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complete social network because it did not account for other modes of
communication.”189
What intelligence gaps would be created if the program is not renewed?
Two important aspects of the CDR program come to mind. First, the program
allows for the storage of CDRs around specific seeds meeting a RAS threshold of
potential ties to international terrorism. As the National Academies study on bulk
collection concluded:
If past events become interesting in the present, because
intelligence-gathering priorities change to include detection of new
kinds of threats or because of new events such as the discovery that
an individual is a terrorist, historical events and the context they
provide will be available for analysis only if they were previously
collected.190
Second, Section 215 has a “second hop” feature allowing investigators to
move from the known target to other entities across a chain. This feature of the
Section 215 program does not currently exist under either Section 702 authorities
or traditional FISA warrants.
It is impossible to know, based solely on publicly available information,
whether the loss of these two features of the Section 215 program would create a
national-security risk. But given the declining value of the program, and the
apparent fact that NSA has chosen to suspend it, this seems unlikely. The 2020
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board report on the USA FREEDOM Act
program included NSA’s statement that “an intelligence program of similar
duration and cost would be expected to produce thousands or tens of thousands of
reports.”191 Instead the CDR program produced only 15 reports over several
years.192
Congress, in its intelligence oversight capacity, should ask if there is any
reason to expect the numbers to be different in the future. However, for two
different reasons, that seems highly unlikely. Of the 15 reports, “11 duplicated
information that was already present in FBI files;”193 two others had information
that FBI had received from other sources.194 And second, as already noted, terrorists
communicate by multiple methods; the NSA observed that the CDR collection is
unlikely to unveil the terrorist’s full social network.195

See Government’s Use of the CDRs, supra note 146, at 27 n.126.
See National Research Council’s Bulk SIGINT Collection Report, supra note 10, at 9.
191
See Government’s Use of the CDRs, supra note 146, at 28.
192
See Government’s Use of the CDRs, supra note 146, at 62.
193
See Government’s Use of the CDRs, supra note 146, at 31.
194
Government’s Use of the CDRs, supra note 146, at 31.
195
See Government’s Use of the CDRs, supra note 146, at 27.
189
190

348
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 11
2. The Increased Value of Section 702 Authorities
The move towards social media and other forms of IP communications has
not only reduced the value of the Section 215 metadata program; it also increased
the value of Section 702’s authorities. As previously discussed, between PRISM
and upstream collection, NSA can compel the assistance of U.S.-based electronics
communications service providers and companies that control the
telecommunication “backbone.” These companies release to the NSA both the
contents and metadata around communications of foreign persons who are
reasonably believed to be located abroad.
The IC has made the value of Section 702 clear. PCLOB noted that as of
2014, “over a quarter of the NSA’s reports concerning international terrorism
include information based in whole or in part on Section 702 collection, and this
percentage has increased every year since the statute was enacted.”196 IC leadership
has repeatedly affirmed that Section 702 now provides “critical foreign intelligence
that cannot practicably be obtained through other methods.”197 In a Congressional
hearing in June 2017, then NSA Director Admiral Michael Rogers said that the 702
collection is “more and more impactful for us. It generates more and more value.”198
Former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Matthew Olsen
concurred:
Against this backdrop of a dynamic and lethal terrorism threat posed
by ISIS, the ability of the United States to conduct surveillance
under Section 702 is vital to our security. Through the surveillance
of communications under this authority, the government gains
information that is often unavailable from other sources about the
identities of terrorists, their networks, and their plans and
capabilities. This surveillance allows the government to peer inside
highly secretive terrorist organizations that are difficult to penetrate
and to obtain unvarnished intelligence about how these groups
operate and seek to carry out attacks, often long before plots are
executed... Moreover, the flexibility of Section 702 collection,
according to the PCLOB, enables the government to maintain
196
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coverage on particular individuals as they add or switch their modes
of communications.199
The IC has publicized cases in which Section 702 was used in thwarting the
ISIS terrorist threat. ISIS recruiter Shawn Parson was an active member of ISIS’s
English-speaking media effort, using social media to encourage terrorist attacks
against specific U.S. soft targets.200 The IC used Section 702 to determine members
of Parson’s propaganda network.201 This was used to prevent ISIS recruitment
efforts, ultimately leading to the 2015 drone that killed both Parson and Junaid
Hussain.202 The IC relied almost exclusively on Section 702 to monitor the
communications of his close associate, Abdulrahman Mustafa al-Qaduli (known as
Hajji Iman), who was at one point considered ISIS’s second in command.203 Iman
was killed during an operation in March 2016.204
While encryption may prevent U.S. government agencies from reading the
communications, use of messaging apps allows for significant intelligence to be
gleaned from the communications metadata. SureSpot, for example, stores
usernames, friend and block relationships, time stamps on messages, and the total
number of messages and images sent by a user.205
Based in Colorado, SureSpot is under U.S. jurisdiction, but not all
companies supplying IP-based messaging applications are. RocketChat, for
example, was produced by a Brazilian company and Telegram is now based in
Dubai. The ability of investigators to compel these companies to release metadata
depends on either collaboration with local law enforcement or on voluntary
disclosures made by the companies. Nonetheless, with the majority of social media
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platforms operating from U.S. soil, the jurisdictional issues pose less of an
immediate risk to Section 702’s efficacy.
Section 702 serves other purposes beyond addressing the contemporary
terrorist threat to the United States. It has been utilized on multiple occasions as a
source of counterterrorism intelligence to foreign governments206 and has been
useful in addressing the emerging threat of cyber terrorism and state-sponsored
cyber-attacks. As the potential for a cyber terrorist attack continues to mount,
Section 702 will continue to be a useful counter-terrorism surveillance tool long
into the future.
The various ways in which Section 702 has been used to tackle the
contemporary foreign terrorist challenges highlight the shortcomings of the Section
215 program. Section 702 authorities correspond far better with the ways in which
terrorists communicate in the post-smartphone, post-IP-communication era and are
far more effective in thwarting terrorist plots and identifying new terrorist targets
than Section 215 authorities.207
IV. Properly Framing the Issues
We began with three questions: Why, with only 40 targets, did NSA collect
so many CDRs? What was the technical problem that caused the agency to purge
three years of CDR records in May 2019? Is the CDR program efficacious as a
counterterrorism investigative tool? Two questions remain: What would have
helped Congress understand in 2015 that the time for the CDR collection had
passed? What should Congress do now?
A. Why Didn’t Congress Know in 2015 that the CDR Collection was No
Longer Useful?
When Edward Snowden disclosed the CDR program in June 2013,
President Obama felt compelled to explain what it was about: “When it comes to
telephone calls, nobody is listening to your telephone calls.”208 Many in the
government who knew of the bulk metadata collection assumed the public would
have no problem with it. The President’s initial public statements on the program
reflected that assumption. But already in 2013, a time when the words
“communications metadata” were not particularly well known, the public
understood that call histories reveal a significant amount of personal information
about an individual. The public’s immediate response to the bulk collection
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program was strongly negative. Congress took notice, focusing largely on the
program’s infringement of privacy rights and civil liberties.
While the President’s Review Committee and PCLOB considered efficacy,
that issue was not on Congress’s radar. Yet understanding efficacy—the goals of a
surveillance program and how well it achieves them—is essential to striking a
balance between privacy and civil liberties on the one hand, and public safety and
security on the other. Unlike the more expansive concerns over the balance between
privacy and security, questions of efficacy are not philosophical or constitutional;
they are rooted in pragmatism. These are descriptive rather than normative
questions. Using analysis of various different types—understanding the changes in
communications technologies, the trends in their use, the changes in foreign
terrorist organizations, and the resulting changes in how those groups “direct”
attacks on the U.S—we have shown that the CDR collection has not been
efficacious and that it is unlikely to be so in the future. This analysis demolishes the
argument for continuing the program.
This Article’s value lies in the analysis explaining why the CDR collection
authority is no longer useful in combatting foreign-instigated domestic terrorism;
that is why the Article is largely analytical rather than prescriptive. Our analysis
makes clear that, at the time the act passed, the value of the CDR collection had
already waned. During the course of our research, one of us asked former NSA
Deputy Director Chris Inglis about this conclusion. Inglis concurred, saying,
“There is some truth to it.”209
Indeed, ODNI has been public about this for some time. Consider how
ODNI described Section 702. Well before the Snowden revelations surfaced, in a
letter dated May 4, 2012, then-Director of Legislative Affairs at ODNI Kathleen
Turner and Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weich wrote the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence highlighting the increasing importance of Section 702
over all other FISA authorities, describing the 702 powers as a “critical tool in the
Government’s efforts to acquire foreign intelligence necessary to protect the
nation’s security.”210 The two suggested reauthorization was a “top legislative
priority of the intelligence community.”211 In the wake of the 2017 sunsetting of
the Section 702 program, and prior to its reauthorization, NSA’s General Counsel
Glenn Gerstell argued, “Section 702 represents one of NSA’s most important
intelligence surveillance authorities, and it provides tremendous value in the
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nation’s fight against foreign terrorists.”212 He explained, “a failure to reauthorize
Section 702 would place the U.S. at a perilous disadvantage, hindering our ability
to identify and respond to threats against the nation and our allies.”213
Compare this powerful language to the pallid statements made concerning
the bulk telephony metadata program prior to the 2015 enactment of the USA
FREEDOM Act and introduction of a constrained CDR program. When called to
showcase successful uses of the program, members of the IC would often bundle
its use with the Section 702 authorities, referring to them together as the “bulk
collection programs.”214 For example, in defending the Section 215 metadata
program, NSA Director Keith Alexander argued that these bulk collection
programs as a unitary whole “contributed to our understanding, and in many cases
helped enable the disruption of terrorist plots.”215 Attorney General Loretta Lynch
and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper wrote to Congress, citing
Section 215 alongside FISA pen registers and National Security Letters as
providing “essential operational capabilities” and arguing that, in the absence of
authorizing legislation that would keep all programs running, the IC would lose
“important intelligence authorities.”216
This was misleading. The Justice Department’s Inspector General’s report,
released a few weeks prior to the USA FREEDOM Act’s authorization vote in
Congress, had reached the very opposite conclusion about the bulk metadata
collection. It noted that the majority of interviews conducted with FBI agents, “did
not identify any major case developments that resulted from use of the records
obtained in response to Section 215 orders.”217 But NSA continued to publicly
endorse the program’s value.
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There are two possible explanations for this. One may have been political
pressure. A former official said that following the disclosures, “There was a great
desire to circle the wagons. If Snowden hadn’t revealed [the metadata program],
NSA probably would have dumped it on their own.”218 Another may have been the
program’s peripheral value in supporting investigations. As Inglis explained, “If
you could get [the metadata program] under control, it was still useful. [But] zero
tolerance is the real driver here.”219 Avoiding all domestic terrorist attacks is a
worthy goal, yet it seems implausible in the face of the current wave of jihadistinspired homegrown attacks.
To anyone carefully reading the tea leaves, it was clear by the mid-2010s
that members of the IC saw diminishing returns from the CDR program.
That Congress reauthorized the program anyway underscores several
failures. First, the IC did not publicly clarify that the CDR program which was
already of waning value, and this value was likely only to decrease further. Second,
Congress failed to ask the right questions. In debating the USA FREEDOM Act,
Congress focused on the civil liberties and privacy risks of the previous program,
but it did not carefully examine issues of efficacy. And yet the information behind
the arguments in this Article—the revolution in communications technologies,
trends in their use, and transitions in how foreign terrorist organizations operate—
were in the public domain. The IC understood how the future was trending;
Congress did not. The lesson is clear. In intelligence oversight, study the trees, but
never lose sight of the forest.
Technological changes now occur not at the speed of the Industrial
Revolution, spanning a century, but at Internet speed, spanning just months.
Understanding the import of these changes and anticipating future changes are
necessary to considering the future of USA FREEDOM Act—and all other U.S.
intelligence programs. Congress must have the resources it needs to ask the right
questions and properly exercise its mandate as an intelligence oversight body. This
does not seem to be the case at present. The Congressional Research Service reports
that the intelligence committees have approximately the same number of staff as
they did in 1987,220 even though their challenges have grown far more complex.
Access issues compound the staff resources challenge. Only congressional staffers
who staff certain committees (such as Intelligence, Foreign Services, Armed
Services, and Homeland Security) can get TS/SCI clearances.221 Members of
218
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Congress not on those particular committees cannot obtain full TS/SCI clearances
for their staff, constraining their own ability to fully review classified information
about collection.
The issue extends well beyond the intelligence committees. Sufficient
expertise in new and emerging technologies and the implications of their use must
be available to Congress so that legislation reflects technological realities of the
future. Laws must be made for the world that is coming, and without access to
technical expertise, Congress cannot govern wisely or well. Since the dismantling
of the Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”) in 1995, Congress lacks internal
bodies chartered to develop objective and authoritative analysis of complex
scientific and technical issues. The introduction of designated funds for reviving
the OTA into the 2020 spending bill might signal a shift in the right direction.222
B. What Should Congress Do?
In early March 2019, Luke Murry, national security adviser for House
Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, confirmed on the Lawfare podcast that
collection under the CDR program had not taken place over the previous past six
months. Murry suggested that the Administration may not seek to renew the UFA
authorities undergirding the program.223 Since then other members of the IC have
come out against renewing the program; the Administration seems to have adopted
the opposite view.224 Regardless of what the Administration and IC ultimately
decide to do, Congress should use the law’s renewal as an opportunity to review
the last three years of the program. Doing so gives an opportunity to examine three
important issues.
First, Congress should examine programmatic shortcomings associated
with its review and reauthorization process of intelligence authorities by asking
questions, including:
1. Was the CDR program useful to the IC in the period of 2015–18 under
the USA FREEDOM Act? What metrics were used to make this
judgement?225
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2. If not, could the IC have anticipated this in 2015 given the changes in
communications technologies and organizational structure of foreignbased terrorist groups?
3. The 2015 National Academies study on technical alternatives for Bulk
Signals Intelligence Collection observed that bulk collection was the
only way to go back in history.226 Does the abandonment of the program
mean that use is no longer important? Could that have been anticipated
in 2015?
4. What questions should Congress have asked in 2014 and 2015 that it
failed to ask?
5. What changes could Congress implement in the way it conducts its
intelligence oversight work to ensure these questions would be raised in
the future?
One possible answer to the last question could involve shifting the focus of
congressional hearings. As Tommy Ross notes, the “most mundane aspects of
intelligence work—how agencies are organized, how personnel are recruited and
developed, how programs are administered and executed, and how resources are
budgeted and allocated” are critical for intelligence oversight.227 As technology
grows more complicated and intelligence capabilities become more pervasive,
those engaging in oversight also need to understand each program’s value in a
changing threat environment. To the extent that the writing was already on the wall
in 2015, Congress must ask itself how it renewed a controversial program under
such public and legislative scrutiny without deeply examining efficacy. How can
we avoid repeating this mistake in the future?
One looming issue is the growing importance of Section 702 in
investigating cases of foreign-inspired U.S. domestic terrorism. Changes in U.S.
domestic terrorism, specifically the rise of right-wing terrorism, could have wide
ramifications here. The United States wrestled with the proper balance of
investigations and civil liberties in the 1970s; striking this balance has grown harder
as a result of new technologies. Congress cannot afford to ignore these concerns.
Second, many unanswered questions remain around the June 2018 purge
and the broader usefulness of the program.228 Answering these on the record—even
in a closed hearing with answers redacted prior to publication—should be part of
the public disclosure process that the IC has undertaken in the years since the
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Snowden disclosures. Congressional intelligence oversight committees should
determine answers to the following:
6. What problem triggered the CDR purge? What controls did NSA put in
place to prevent similar problems from arising in the future?
7. Did the purge of three years’ worth of CDRs impact the ability to
effectively conduct international terrorist investigations?
Finally, Congress needs to decide what to do with the CDR collection
authority. It has three options. First, it may seek to sidestep potential controversies
around reauthorization by adopting a blanket or “clean” extension of all the powers
listed under the “business records” provision of FISA, with no amendments or
changes.229 Such an extension could be done with or without a new sunset clause,
the latter approach seems to be favored by the White House. 230 While a straight
reauthorization will keep the CDR authority on the books, it would not compel the
government to operate the program. This would allow the IC to re-launch the
program in the future, if technological shifts were ever to make it efficacious. This
approach would also ensure that the same oversight checks introduced in UFA
would remain operative should the program ever restart.
A second option would be to allow the authorities to expire. Professor
Robert Chesney has advised against this, noting that much more than just the CDR
authority would be lost.231 For starters, three provisions of the USA PATRIOT
Act—the roving wiretap provision, the lone wolf provision, and the full Section
215 “business records” provision (not just its current CDR program)—would sunset
in December 2019.232 Because Section 215 authorizes FISA court orders for
business records separate from the CDR program for both counter-terrorism and
counter-intelligence investigations, this provision will revert back to its pre-2001
USA PATRIOT Act form if Congress opts for complete expiration. The 1998
version of the business records provision excluded many categories subject to
governmental reach and limited collection to records belonging to an alleged “agent
of a foreign power.”233 Reverting to this version would weaken the FBI’s ability to
gather intelligence in a wide range of national security investigations.
If that is not enough, in the absence of the authorities created by UFA,
nothing would stop a future president from reinstating bulk collection through an
executive order (something that is currently prevented by the introduction of a
“specific selection term” (“SST”) under UFA). Expiration would also eliminate
UFA’s protections for FISC-order recipients and congressional reporting
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requirements. For these reasons we do not recommend simply letting the authorities
expire.
A third approach could be for Congress to tailor an amendment to the
authorities that does not throw the baby out with the bath water. That said, the
concerns that Caroline Lynch, former Chief Counsel to the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, raised
in her statement to PCLOB carry great weight:
Amending the statute to repeal or modify CDR authority could
prove to be politically challenging. If Congress opts to amend the
statute to repeal CDR authority, it could do so while leaving the
“relevancy” standard, the SST requirement and other 2015 reforms
intact and make the necessary conforming amendments, including
to reporting requirements. Even simply opening up the Act to
affirmatively remove the CDR authority from the statute could
invite a variety of amendments to FISA that address politicallycharged topics, such as whether and under what criteria FISA
authorities can be used to target persons affiliated with a presidential
campaign, or revisit proposals rejected by Congress during the 2015
debate or the subsequent FISA Amendment Act reauthorization
debate.”234
We nonetheless believe that Congress should end the Section 215 program.
To do so without damaging other authorities, Congress would need to carefully
craft an amendment ending UFA’s authorization for collecting CDRs on an ongoing
basis, while retaining safeguards such as the requirement that all Section 215
applications include an SST as the basis for the production. Such an amendment
would allow the government to continue to rely on Section 215 to collect business
records without permitting a return to bulk collection.
The bottom line for a program, any program, should be efficacy—even
more so when the program may violate privacy or civil rights. Press reports indicate
that NSA has already recommended that the White House officially end the CDR
collection program.235 Thus our proposal is in line with the reported interests of the
IC. We further recommend that the reauthorization of an amended Section 215 be
subject to a sunset. In light of the rapid developments in telecommunications and
terrorism discussed above, we argue that sunsets for foreign surveillance authorities
be shortened and not exceed two-year time periods.
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V. Conclusion
Whatever Congress ultimately decides to do with the specific CDR
authority, the lessons from this episode should be understood within their broader
context. As terrorists find new ways to organize themselves and plot attacks against
the United States, and as technology continues to redefine our means of
communication, the relative value of individual intelligence programs will evolve.
A counterterrorism program that plays a critical role today may not be useful
tomorrow. Intelligence oversight bodies must be alert to those changes, routinely
and systematically reviewing the efficacy of each program under their supervision.
Otherwise, we allow authorities that are neither necessary nor wise, and in so doing,
protect neither our security nor our liberty.

